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Mechanism Design Is Not Enough: Prosocial Agents for Cooperative AI

Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Charlie Tharas, Samuele Marro, Van Q. Truong, Bernhard Schölkopf, Emanuele La Malfa, Zhijing Jin

ICML 2026 AIWILD WorkshoparXiv

Using incomplete contract theory, proves that when contracts cannot anticipate every contingency, no realistic mechanism eliminates the welfare loss between self-interested agents. Prosocial agents, which weigh others’ welfare alongside their own, close the gap, as LLM-agent experiments on resource allocation and social dilemmas confirm.

GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game Theory

Pepijn Cobben, Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Thao Amelia Pham, Isabel Dahlgren, Terry Jingchen Zhang, Zhijing Jin

NeurIPS 2026arXivCode

A benchmark of 1,535 high-stakes multi-agent scenarios built on game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Across 15 frontier models, agents fail to pick the socially beneficial action in 38% of cases; game-theoretic interventions improve outcomes by up to 18%.

A Notion of Complexity for Theory of Mind via Discrete World Models

Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Emanuele La Malfa, Samuele Marro, Andrea Asperti, Anthony Cohn, Michael Wooldridge

EMNLP 2024 FindingsPaperarXivCodeWebsite

Measures the complexity of a Theory-of-Mind task as the number of states needed to solve it, and uses it to audit five widely used ToM benchmarks. Introduces Discrete World Models (DWM), a prompting technique that describes how the environment changes as agents act, improving LLM performance on ToM tasks.

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